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Abstract
In this paper we conduct two proper tests of overcondence. We reject the hypoth-
esis the data cannot be generated by a rational modelin both experiments.
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1 Introduction
A large body of literature purports to nd that people are generally overcondent. In
particular, a better-than-average e¤ect in which a majority of people claim to be superior
to the average person has been noted for a wide range of skills, from driving, to spoken
expression, to the ability to get along with others, to test taking on simple tests.1 The
literature generally accepts that this better-than-average e¤ect is indicative of inated self-
assessments. However, Benoît and Dubra (2008) (henceforth B&D) have recently questioned
this stance. They show that the better-than-average data merely has the appearance of
overcondence, but does not indicate true overcondence, which carries with it an implication
that people have made some kind of error in their self-evaluations. Because of this reason,
almost none of the existing experimental literature on relative overcondence can actually
claim to have found overcondence. In fact, most of the experiments by their very design
do not even have the potential of showing overcondence. In this paper, we report on an
experiment designed to provide a proper test of overcondence. The issue of whether people
are in fact overcondent is of paramount importance for economics as it determines the
We thank Uriel Haran for his help with the experiment.
yemail: dubraj@um.edu.uy
1See Benoît and Dubra (2008) for a review. While early research pointed towards a universal better-than-
average e¤ect, more recent work indicates that the e¤ect is primarily for easy tasks and may be reversed for
di¢ cult tasks.
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equilibrium outcomes in almost every market.2 Having a correct test of overcondence is
then relevant. The following example taken directly from B&D illustrates the basic idea why
previous tests have been misspecied.
Consider a large population with three types of drivers, low skilled, medium skilled, and
high skilled, and suppose that the probabilities of any one of them causing an accident in
any single period are pL = 45 ; pM =
2
5
; and pH = 0. In period 0, nature chooses a skill level
for each person with equal probability. Initially no driver knows his or her own skill level,
and so each person (rationally) evaluates himself as no better or worse than average. In
period 1, everyone drives and learns something about his skill, based upon whether or not
he has caused an accident. Each person is then asked how his driving skill compares to the
rest of the population. How does a driver who has not caused an accident reply?
Using Bayesrule, he evaluates his own skill level as follows:
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Such a driver thinks there is over a 1
2
chance (in fact, 5
9
) that his skill level is in the top
third of all drivers. His mean probability of an accident is 5
9
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5
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5
= 2
9
, which is better
than for 2
3
of the drivers, and better than the population mean. Furthermore, his beliefs
about himself strictly rst order stochastically dominate the population distribution. Any
way he looks at it, a driver who has not had an accident should evaluate himself as better
than average. Since 3
5
of drivers have not had an accident, 3
5
rationally rank themselves as
better than average.
As this example shows, the fact that 60% of drivers rank themselves above the median
does not indicate erroneous self-evaluations. In fact, Theorem 1 below shows that any
fraction of people could rank themselves as being in the top half of the population without
any overcondence being implied. Therefore, any experiment designed just to test for a
better-than-average-e¤ect cannot possibly show overcondence.
We conduct a test that has the potential to reveal that people are not making rational
assessments of their abilities. The experiment is based upon the theory developed in B&D,
which we briey review in Section 2. Although the subjects in our experiment also give
2Papers on overcondence in economics include Camerer and Lovallo (1999) who study experimentally
entry in an industry, Fang and Moscarini (2005) analyzing the e¤ect of overcondence on optimal wage
setting, Garcia, Sangiorgi and Urosevic (2007) who characterize the e¢ ciency consequences of overcondence
in information acquisition in nancial markets, Hoelzl and Rustichini (2005) who test for overcondence,
K½oszegi (2006) who studies how overcondence a¤ects how people choose tasks or careers, Menkho¤ et al.
(2006) who analyze the e¤ect of overcondence on herding by fund managers, Noth and Weber (2003),
Sandroni and Squintani (2008), Van den Steen (2004) and Zábojník (2004). In nance, recent papers include
Barber and Odean (2001), Biais et al. (2005), Bernardo and Welch (2001), Chuang and Lee (2006), Daniel,
Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (2001), Kyle and Wang (1997), Malmendier and Tate (2005), Peng and Xiong
(2006), Wang (2001).
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the supercial appearance of being overcondent, we do not nd any evidence that they
are in fact overcondent. To our knowledge, the only other experiment that conducts a
proper test of a better-than-average bias, is Clark and Friesen (2008), and they also do not
nd such a bias. In fact, the experiment of Camerer and Lovallo (1999), when correctly
interpreted, also provides such a test. More concretely, Camerer and Lovallo (1999) claim to
nd overcondence because their subjects enter an industry more when their payo¤ depends
on their score on a trivia quiz than when it depends on a random draw. B&D argue that that
test is misspecied because that is not the right statistic to look at; rather, one should look
at prots made by entrants, and prots are positive in the treatment without self selection,
indicating that people are in fact not overcondent (see B&D for more on this issue).
The most common type of experiment in this eld asks subjects how they rank compared
to others. For instance, Weinstein (1980) asks students to compare themselves to the average
student on a variety of attributes including their chances getting a good job o¤er before
graduation and their chances of developing a drinking problem. Similarly, Svenson (1981)
asks subjects in a room to estimate how their driving compares to the other subjects in the
room, and to make an estimate of the form I drive better than x% of the people in this
room.
There are at least four criticisms that can be made of this type of experiment:
1. Participants have no material incentive to answer the question accurately.
2. It may be unclear to the subjects what is meant by an averagestudent. In particular,
should the average be interpreted as the mean or median (or something else still)?
3. Subjects may be uncertain of their own skill levels, making the meaning of their answers
unclear.
4. No attention is paid to the degree of condence that the subjects have in their self-
placements.
The rst two criticisms are quite familiar, so let us turn to the last two. Consider a
subject who is asked to rank himself on IQ, given that the median IQ is 100. If he has not
actually taken an IQ test then he must guess at his IQ. Suppose, for the sake of argument,
that he believes that his IQ is 80 with probability 0.45, 110 with probability 0.45, and 115
with probability 0.1. How should he rank himself? He could reasonably respond that be
believes himself to be of above average intelligence, given that there is over a 50% chance
that his IQ is above average. On the other hand, he could just as reasonably respond that
he is of below average intelligence, given that his mean IQ is only 97. Thus, the subjects
answer to the question gives no clear indication of its meaning. By the same token, we have
no way of knowing his degree of condence when he utters a statement like I believe I
have a higher IQ than the average person. As we will discuss, both these ambiguities have
important implications. Note, however, that if, as a matter of fact, subjects have very tight
estimates of their types then both these issues become moot the means and medians will
be about the same and subjects will be almost 100% condent in their self-placements. In
addition to testing for overcondence we test the hypothesis that subjects do not have very
tight estimates of their types. Note that in the previous driving example, 3
5
of the drivers
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believe that their mean abilities and median abilities are better than average, justifying their
overcondent seeming answers. At the same time, each of these drivers thinks there is a 4
9
chance that he is not above average, and even a 1
9
chance that he is below average.
Even if we grant that subjects with no material incentive respond to questionnaires as
accurately as possible, so that point 1) above is not an issue, an experiment that fails to pay
attention to any one of the remaining points will fail as a test of overcondence, as we show
in the following section.
2 Background
When should we say that a person is overcondent? An immediate proposal is that an
overcondent person is not as skillfulas she thinks she is. However, making such a deter-
mination may be problematic, as many skills are not easily measured. For instance, consider
a person who asserts I am a very good driver. Even supposing that we can make the
notion of very goodprecise and that we can agree on what constitutes a very good driver,
how are we to determine if the statement is true? Giving the person a driving test may not
be practical. Moreover, the skills measured in such a test may not match up very well with
the day-to-day skills reected in the drivers self-assessment.
Researchers have circumvented these problems by considering entire populations at once
and asking subjects how their skills compare to each other. Beyond circumvention, there are
at least two reasons to be interested in relative self-assessments. Firstly, in many domains
people may well have a better idea of their relative placements than their absolute placements.
Thus, we might expect students to have a better idea of their math abilities relative to their
classmates, than of their absolute abilities. Secondly, in many areas of interest, relative
ability is of primary importance. For instance, in many jobs success depends primarily on a
persons abilities relative to his or her peers.
The basic idea behind the relative population approach is that, since not more than 50%
can be in the top 50% in skill level, if more than half the people in a population claim to
be in the top half or make choices which reveal such a belief they mustbe making an
error. However, as the example in the introduction shows, this idea is awed. Obviously, it
is important to have a proper theoretical framework for discussing overcondence.
Clearly, the implication in terming a population overcondent is that the members of
the population have made some errors or have some inconsistencies in their self-evaluations.3
Thus, B&D proposes that data be called overcondent only if it cannot be obtained from
a population which derives its beliefs in a fully rational and consistent manner. A fairly
standard model for a population deriving its beliefs in such a manner is as follows:
Denition 1 A signalling structure is a triplet  = (S;; f), where S is a set of signals,
  R is a type space, and f = ffg2 is a collection of probability distributions over S.
Denition 2 A signalling model consists of a population of individuals and a signalling
structure  = (S;; f) such that:
3These errors can be expected to lead to further errors, such as too many people attempting to become
professional athletes.
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i) In period 0, nature picks a type  2  for each individual, resulting in some distribution
p; initially, each persons belief about her own type is given by this distribution.
ii) In period 1, an individual of type  receives a signal s 2 S according to the probability
distribution f; each person updates her initial belief using Bayesrule.
 Throughout this paper we assume that higher types are more skillful.
A person of type t is said to be in the top x of a population if the fraction of people
whose type is greater than or equal to t is at most x. Thus, in a population of 100 people at
most 30 can be in the top 30%.
Denition 3 Suppose that a fraction y of a population of N people believe that there is a
probability q that their type is in the top x of the population. These beliefs can be rationalized
if there is a signalling model with N individuals in which the expected fraction of people who
will have these beliefs after updating is y.
Notice that by asking that y be the expected fraction of people who will hold the particular
beliefs, the denition is demanding: Data cannot be rationalized simply because it is possible
that it could arise in a stochastic environment. If the data from an experiment can be
rationalized, there is no reason to call it overcondent.
The following Theorem, taken from B&D, provides the basis for our tests of overcon-
dence.
Theorem 1 Consider a population of N people and two integers 0  m  N and 1  r  N .
Suppose a fraction y = m
N
of the population believe that there is a probability at least q that
their types are in the top x = r
N
of the population. These beliefs can be rationalized if and
only if qy  x.
The following example illustrates the Theorem. Consider ten people who are to take a
math test. First suppose that seven of them believe that there is at least a 1
2
probability
that their type is in the top 3 (so that qy > x). If this belief were rational, then on average
at least 1
2
 7
10
 100% = 35% of the population would be in the top 30%, a clear absurdity.
On the other hand, suppose instead that 6
10
of the people believe that there is at least a
1
2
probability that their type is in the top 30%. How could these beliefs rationally arise?
One simple way is as follows. Before the test, a brief conversation reveals that six of them
have an advanced degree in mathematics, whereas the remaining four have only high school
mathematics. With no further information, the six can rationally believe they will place in
the top six, with the precise order being uniformly random. Hence each of the six believes
there is a 1
2
chance he or she will place in the top 30%.
Armed with Theorem 1, we are in a position to better appreciate the four criticisms of
prior experiments made in the introduction.
Consider a person who is given the choice between a 50% chance at a prize, and the
prize if she places in the top half of a subject pool on a test (as in Hoelzl and Rustichini,
2005). The person has been incentivized and the meaning of average is irrelevant , so
Criticism 1 and 2 are irrelevant. Suppose the person strictly prefers the prize based on her
test placement. The meaning of her preference is clear she believes that there is more than
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a 50% chance that she places in the top half so that Criticism 3 does not apply. However,
the strength of this belief exactly how much more than 50% is unclear, so that Criticism
4 applies. Theorem 1 tells us that almost everybody could rationally prefer the placement
alternative, rendering the experiment useless as a test for overcondence.4
Svenson (1981) nds that 46% of (American) subjects in his experiment claim to be in
the top 20% of subjects in their driving skill level. His subjects are not incentivized. More
importantly, even granting the veracity of their answers, the meaning of these claims is
unclear (Criticism 3). If the subjects, who presumably are uncertain of exactly how skillful
they are as drivers, are answering based upon their self-beliefs about their median type, then
Theorem 1 shows that the subjects are displaying overcondence. However, if the subjects
are answering based upon their self-beliefs about their mean type, then Theorem 4 in B&D
shows that their answers are consistent with purely rational self-assessments.5
3 The experiment
We are interested in the extent to which previous ndings of apparent overcondence could
be shown to be actual overcondence. Previous experimental work and the theory in B&D
show that populations exhibit the better-than-average e¤ect more on easy tasks than di¢ cult
ones.6 Accordingly, we gave our subjects an easy test and motivated them.
Subjects were 134 individuals recruited through the web site of the Center for Behavioral
Decision Research at Carnegie Mellon University<http://cbdr.cmu.edu/experiments/>. We
will report the data for the 129 subjects who had complete responses to the three choices with
which they were presented; the results are unchanged when we analyze, for each question,
all the answers we have for that question.
The experiment was advertised under the name Test yourselfalong with the following
description: Participants in this study will take a test with logic and math puzzles. How
much money people make depends on their performance and on how they choose to bet on
that performance.This wording of the recruitment instructions was chosen to be conductive
to more overcondent looking data (Camerer and Lovallo (1999) nd that excess entry
into their game (their measure of overcondence) is much larger when subjects volunteer to
participate in the experiment knowing that payo¤s would depend on skill). So, if anything,
our results are biased towards nding overcondence (but we dont).
Subjects had a mean age of 25 years (SD = 6.4) and 42 percent of them were male.
All subjects took a 20-item quiz of math and logic puzzles. They made a series of three
choices between (1) bets on their test performance (skill) and (2) chance gambles of known
probability. Subjects had to choose one of the two for each of the three pairs of bets. The
three pairs of bets are listed below.
4Even everybody (as opposed to almost everybody) strictly prefering the placement bet is consistent with
rationality, given an inevitable sampling errordue to the nite population.
5See B&D for a more detailed discussion of the issue.
6The theory in Healy and Moore (2007) also predicts that an easy test should yield more overcondent
looking data.
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Skill Option
1. You will receive $10 if your test score
puts you in the top half of previous test-
takers. In other words, if your score is better
than at least 50% of other test-takers, you
will get $10.
.
.
2. You will receive $10 if your test score
puts you in the top 30% of previous test-
takers. In other words, if your score is better
than at least 70% of other test takers, you
will get $10.
.
.
3. You will receive $10 if your test score
puts you in the top half of previous test-
takers. In other words, if your score is better
than at least 50% of other test takers, you
will get $10
.
.
Chance Option
1. There is a 50% chance you will receive
$10. We have a bag with 5 blue poker chips
and 5 red poker chips. You will reach in to
the bag without looking and randomly select
one of the poker chips. If the poker chip is
blue, then you will get $10. If it is red, you
will get nothing
2. There is a 50% chance you will receive
$10. We have a bag with 5 blue poker chips
and 5 red poker chips. You will reach in to
the bag without looking and randomly select
one of the poker chips. If the poker chip is
blue, then you will get $10. If it is red, you
will get nothing.
3. There is a 60% chance you will receive
$10. We have a bag with 6 blue poker chips
and 5 red poker chips. You will reach in to
the bag without looking and randomly select
one of the poker chips. If the poker chip is
blue, then you will get $10. If it is red, you
will get nothing.
Subjects were randomly assigned to experimental conditions that crossed two treatment
variables: motivation and feedback.
The motivation manipulation varied what subjects were told about the test they were
about to take. Those in the high motivation condition read:
In this experiment, you will be taking an intelligence test. Intelligence, as you know, is
an important dimension on which people di¤er. There are many positive things associated
with higher intelligence, including the fact that more intelligent people are more likely to
get better grades and advance farther in their schooling. It may not be surprising to you
that more intelligent people also tend to earn more money professionally. Indeed, according
to research by Beaton (1975) ten IQ points are worth about four thousand dollars in annual
salary. Childrens intelligence is a good predictor of their future economic success according
to Herrnstein and Murray (1994). Of course, this is partly because, as documented in
research by Lord, DeVader, and Alliger (1986) intelligent people are perceived to have greater
leadership potential and are given greater professional opportunities. But what may be
surprising to you is that intelligent people also tend to have signicantly better health and
longer life expectancies (see research by Gottfredson & Deary, 2004).
Those in the low motivation condition read: In this experiment, you will be taking a
test of math and logic puzzles.
Then subjects saw a set of sample test items. In order to constitute this set of sample
items, we began with a larger set of 40 test items. One half of this set was randomly chosen
for Test Set S. The other half belonged to Test Set M. Those participants who would take
Test S saw sample items from Set M, and vice versa.
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Half of the subjects (those in the feedback condition) received a histogram showing how
others had scored on the test they were about to take.
Next, subjects chose between skill and chance options for each of the three bets. The
order in which the three bets appeared was varied randomly, as was whether the chance or
the skill option appeared rst for each bet. Participants were told that they would make the
three choices again after taking the test, and that one of these six choices would be randomly
selected at the end of the experiment to count for actual payo¤s.
Then subjects took the twenty-item test under a ten-minute time limit. The two test sets
appear in Appendix A. Subjects earned $.25 for each test question they answered correctly.7
Then subjects chose between the skill and chance options for each of the three bets again.
Subjects then answered a series of questions (shown in Appendix B) regarding what they
thought their score would be, how they felt during the experiment, etc.
Finally, if a subject chose to bet on chance (rather than their test performance) for the
one bet that counted, an experimenter had the subject draw from the relevant bag of poker
chips to determine whether he or she won the $10 prize.
4 The data
Before taking the test, each subject was presented with the three previously listed groups
of choices. The order in which subjects were presented with these choices was randomized
among subjects. The choices can be summarized as:
1. Benchmark Choice: A 50% chance of a prize (as determined by a random draw), or
to be awarded the prize if your score on the test places you in the top 50% of previous
test takers.
2. High Placement Choice: A 50% chance of a prize (as determined by a random
draw), or to be awarded the prize if your score on the test places you in the top 30%
of previous test takers.
3. Strength Choice: A 60% chance of a prize (as determined by a random draw), or to
be awarded the prize if your score on the test places you in the top 50% of previous
test takers.
There are 5 variables, none of which had any e¤ect on the choice behavior of subjects (or
their scores).
First, as expected, neither of the following three randomizations had any e¤ect:
 The order of the presentation of the bets (123, 132, 213, etc).
 Whether the skill or random bet was presented rst in each pair.
7In the design of Hoelzl and Rustichini everybody in a group was paid according to the same criterion
(skill or chance) after the individuals had voted for which one it would be. In order to avoid the multiplicity
of equilibria in the voting stage, we paid each subject according to his choice. We then introduced the
payment per correct answer in order to avoid shirking by those who had chosen the random bets.
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 Whether subjects saw sample M and took test S, or saw S and took M.
Second, we didnt have a prior belief of how the feedback manipulation would a¤ect
scores or choices between bets; it had no e¤ect. Finally, and surprisingly to us, the Moti-
vation manipulation had no e¤ect either. Hence, we discuss only aggregate data, without
discriminating by treatments.
Of paramount importance to a subject is her score on the test. Thus, it is most convenient
to model a subjects typeas just being this score.8 This means that at the time she makes
her decision, the subject does not yet have a type. Rather, her type is a random variable
to be determined later. Formally, this poses no di¢ culties. Based on her life experiences
and the sample test she sees, the subject has a distribution over her possible types, i.e., test
scores. In the Benchmark Choice, a subject (presumably) prefers to be rewarded based on
her placement if there is more than a 50% chance her type is in the top 50%. In the High
Placement Choice, a subject prefers to be rewarded based on her placement if there is more
than a 50% chance her type is in the top 30%. In the Strength Choice, a subject prefers to
be rewarded based on her placement if there is more than a 60% chance that her type is in
the top 50%.
As expected, in the Benchmark Choice, the population displays apparent overcondence:
74% choose to be rewarded based upon their placement. Barring too many equally skilled
subjects (and ignoring the possibility of errors), such a result is usually interpreted as 74%
place themselves in the top half of test takers. However, this statement is imprecise, if
not misleading. A more precise interpretation is that 74% believe that there is at least a
50% chance that they are in the top half (or more than 50% chance if we interpret their
preferences as being strict).
Note that these two interpretations are di¤erent and have di¤erent implications for ratio-
nality. In the rst interpretation, if we assume place themselvesindicates (near) certainty,
then the population displays overcondence, not just apparent overcondence. But the more
precise interpretation, the second interpretation, shows that the choice behavior of the sub-
jects is consistent with rationality, as Theorem 1 shows.
Thus, an immediate question of interest is how strong is a subjects belief that she is
in the top half. Imagine that we gave the prior literature on overcondence the benet
of the doubt and interpreted, to the literatures advantage, that the general acceptance
of the better-than-average e¤ect as evidence of overcondence was the consequence of the
shared and unstated belief that people are certain (or almost certain) of their types. This
assumption, however, would conict with much of the psychology and behavioral economics
literatures that show (or sometimes assume) that people are often engaged in a continual
process of updating.
In the behavioral economics literature some inuential papers are based on the presump-
tion that learning about oneself is an ongoing process (Benabou and Tirole (2002) ; see
also K½oszegi, 2006). There are also a few elds within the psychology literature that stress
that subjects are uncertain of their types. As a rst example of these strands, Festingers
(1954) social comparison theory, the insights of which later permeated to several other elds,
begins with his Hypothesis I that there exists, in the human organism, a drive to evaluate
8Other modelings are possible, however, and the choice of modelings is not without consequence.
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his opinions and abilities. As a justication for why people wouldnt know their types, he
writes the unavailability of the opportunity for... clear testing and the vague and multipur-
pose use of various abilities generally make... a clear objective test not feasible or not useful.
For example, how does one decide how intelligent one is?A consequence of this uncertainty
is that people change their estimates of their abilities when they receive feedback. In gen-
eral, in the absence of both a physical and a social comparison, subjective evaluations of
opinions and abilities are unstable. He then adds, even after a person has had a good deal
of experience at a task, the evaluation of what is good performance continues to uctuate.
The ideas put forth by Festinger, have led psychologists to study the drive to learn ones
abilities(see, Trope (1975) and Trope and Brickman (1975) inter alia). Another example
of an inuential theory that postulates that people learn about their abilities and about
themselves is Bems (1967) self-perception theory. His central argument is that individuals
acquire self-knowledge by observing their own behaviour just as an observer would, especially
when internal cues are weak, ambiguous or uninterpretable. Finally, Amabiles (1983)
hypothesis is that if an individual is told that he is creative, his estimate of his creativity
changes.
So how strong is a subjects belief that she is in the top half? Of the 74% who opt for
placing in the top half over a 50% random draw, 22% switch and choose a 60% random draw
over placing in the top half.9 Thus, a signicant fraction of the subjects do not show much
condence in their belief that they are better than average. This fact supports the underlying
premise of B&D (2008), and of Healy and Moore (2008), that people are uncertain of their
types. In particular, it shows that the prior work on overcondence cannot be justied by a
presumption that people are certain, or nearly certain, of their types. Presumably, if we had
asked people to vote for their placement versus a 70% random draw we would have found
even more people defecting from the placement option.
We turn now to the question of overcondence. As noted, Theorem 1 indicates that the
Benchmark Choice cannot show overcondence since every one could prefer the placement
option even in a rational population. However, the Strength Choice and High Placement
Choice do have the potential to show overcondence.
From Theorem 1, the population exhibits overcondence if more than 60% vote for the
skill bet in the High Placement pair of bets, or if 83.3% vote for the skill bet in the Strength
pair of bets. In fact, only 51.9% and not 60% vote for the skill bet in the High Placement
pair of bets; the probability that a sample where 51.9% would vote for skill when in the
population the proportion is really 60% is 3%. Put di¤erently, 51.9% is di¤erent from 60%
at the 3% signicance level; the probability that this sample comes from an overcondent
population in which 60% would vote for the skill placement is 3%. Also, only 64.3% and
not 83.3% choose the skill bet in the Strength pair; the probability that a sample where
64.3% would vote for skill when in the population the proportion is really 83.3% is less than
1%. Put di¤erently, 64.3% is di¤erent from 83.3% at signicance levels lower than 1%; the
probability that this sample comes from an overcondent population in which 83.3% would
vote for the skill placement is less than 1%.
9We note that 6% of the subjects inconsistently favor a 50% draw over their placement, but their placement
over a 60% draw. We have no explanation for this behaviour.
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Thus, we do not nd evidence of overcondence.10
4.1 A Single Model
Theorem 1 indicates that the results from our three questions can all be generated in a
rational fashion. More precisely, the theorem tells us that the data from these three choices
can be rationalized by three di¤erent rational models (three populations, three signalling
structures, etc). However, our data comes from a single subject pool in a single experiment.
We now show by construction that the data can also be generated by a single experiment in
which all the participants are fully rational.
There are twenty-one possible scores in our experiment, and so there are twenty-one
types. Subjects receive signals of their types. (These signals are their life experiences and
the sample test they are shown.) Given the nature of the experiment, the simplest model
to generate the data is one in which the population divides into three equivalence classes.
Types in the lowest equivalence class, l, have a score in the bottom 50% of subjects; types
in the middle equivalence class, m, have a score in-between the bottom 50% and the top
30% of subjects; types in the highest class have a score in the top 30%.
Suppose that each type in a given equivalence class receives one of fours signals s1; s2; s3; s4
according to the same probability distribution. The joint probability distribution of types
and signals is
l m h Marginal
s1 :2599081 :000087 0000049 26%
s2 :0499 :0393 :0108 10%
s3 :051987 :043823 :03419 13%
s4 :1382049 :11679 :2550051 51%
Marginal 1
2
1
5
3
10
The numbers in the above chart are not particularly niceas they must be chosen to t
the data. Importantly, however, the signalling structure itself is nice in that it satises the
monotone likelihood ratio property (for 0 > ; we have that Pr0 (si) =Pr (si) is increasing
in si).
10We also conducted a variation of the experiment which was identical in all respects, except that subjects
were asked to vote after taking the test. In this treatment players are essentially guessing at how many
questions they answered correctly after the fact. Indeed, in the feedback treatment subjects are told the test
scores against which they are competing, so the only question is how their own scores compare to these given
scores. The subjects did not seem particularly adept at this task and exhibited some degree of overestimation
of their scores (this is not about better than average). Specically, 77.5% vote for skill in the Benchmark
Treatment, 65.1% vote for skill in the High Placement treatment, while 73.6% vote for skill in the Strength
Treatment. However, this seems to be a di¤erent type of enquiry than that which is usually addressed in
the better-than-average literature.
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The following table shows Pr (ijsj)
l m h
s1 0:99965 :00033462 :000018846
s2 0:499 0:393 0:108
s3 0:399 9 0:337 1 0:263
s4 0:270 99 0:229 0:50001
Thus, a person who sees the signal, say, s4, believes she has just above a 27% chance of
placing in the bottom 50%, just below a 23% chance of placing higher than the bottom 50%
but lower than the top 30%, and just above a 50% of placing in the top 50%. Such a person
will always vote for the placement option rather one of the random choices, since there is a
73% chance that she places in the top 50% and over a 50% chance that she places in the top
30%. The following table indicates how people who receive the di¤erent signals should vote:
Pr top half vs 50% top 30% vs 50% top half vs 60%
s1 26% Random Random Random
s2 10% Placement Random Random
s3 13% Placement Random Placement
s4 51% Placement Placement Placement
Placement Total 74% 51% 64%
As the bottom row of the table shows, this signalling model generates the data found in our
experiment.
5 Conclusion
As in much previous experimental work, we nd a better-than-average e¤ect among our
subjects. Since the task we assigned the subjects was an easy one, the theory in B&D led us
to expect this nidng. In contrast to previous work, we push further to see if the subjects
exhibit behaviour that is truly indicative of overcondence. We do not nd such evidence.
At the same time, we nd evidence that subjects are uncertain of their own types.
Our experiment can be viewed as a test of the null hypothesis that people are behaving
rationally (and are not overcondent). We cannot reject that hypothesis. Of course, this
is not to say that we can rule out the hypothesis that people are overcondent, either. In
fact, by their very design these types of experiment are ill-suited to rule out overcondent,
or undercondent, behaviour. To understand this claim, suppose that ten subjects are to
be given a Japanese vocabulary test and that nine of them have absolutely no knowledge
of Japanese, while the tenth is Japanese. The nine subjects, who will answer questions
randomly, each have about a 4
9
chance of nishing in the top half while the Japanese subject
will almost certainly nish in the top half. If the subjects are behaving rationally, only 10%
of the people should prefer betting that they place in the top half rather than accepting a
50% chance at a prize. Therefore, if 30% vote for the placement option, the subjects, as a
whole, are overcondent even though they naively appear to be undercondent.
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6 Appendix A: Test items from the two tests
1S) Susie has a cake that she splits into six pieces to share with all her friends. If each person
with a piece of cake then splits their piece in half to give to another friend, how many pieces
of cake are there in the end? 12
1M) The Maroons are rst in the league and the Browns are fth while the Blues are
between them. If the Grays have more points than the Violets and the Violets are exactly
below the Blues then who is second? The Grays
2S) A bridge consists of 10 sections; each section is 2.5 meters long. How far is it from
the edge of the bridge to the center? 12.5 m
2M) Five friends share three oranges equally. Each orange contains ten wedges. How
many wedges does each friend receive? 6
3S) There are four equally spaced beads on a circle. How many straight lines are needed
to connect each bead with every other bead? 6
3M) Fall is to Summer as Monday is to _____? Sunday
4S) HAND is to Glove as HEAD is to _____? Hat
4M) What is the minimum number of toothpicks necessary to spell the word "HAT".
(You are not allowed to break or bend any toothpicks, or use one toothpick as a part of more
than one letter.) 8
5S) John needs 13 bottles of water from the store. John can only carry 3 at a time.
Whats the minimum number of trips John needs to make to the store? 5
5M) Milk is to glass as soup is to _____? bowl
6S) LIVED is to DEVIL as 6323 is to _____? 3236
6M) Which number should be next in the sequence: 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, ? 64
7S) If the day before yesterday is two days after Monday then what day is it today?
Friday
7M) A rancher is building an open-ended (straight) fence by stringing wire between posts
25 meters apart. If the fence is 100 meters long how many posts should the rancher use?
5
8S) Which number should come next in the series: 3, 9, 6, 12, 9, 15, 12, 18, ? 15
8M) Meowis to a cat as Moois to _____? Cow
9S) Which letter logically follows in this sequence: T, Q, N, K, H, ? E
9M) Which word does not belong in the group with the other words? Brown, Black,
Broom, Orange, Bread Orange
10S) If two typists can type two pages in ve minutes, how many typists will it take to
type twenty pages in ten minutes? 10
10M) If a woman is 21 and is half the age of her mom, how old will the mom be when
the woman is 42? 63
11S) Tiger is to stripes as leopard is to _____? Spots
11M) Which number should come next: 514, 64, 8, 1, 1/8, ? 1/64
12S) Brother is to sister as nephew is to _____? Niece
12M) Which number should come next in this series: 1 - 1 - 2 - 3 - 5 - 8 - 13 - ? 21
13S) Desert is to oasis as ocean is to _____? Island
13M) If 10 missionaries have 3 children each, but only two thirds of the children survive,
how many children survive? 20
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14S) Kara has $100. She decides to put 20% in savings, donate 20% to a charity, spend
40% on bills, and use 20% for a shopping spree. How much money does she have left over
afterwards? $0
14M) Kimberly makes $20 per hour and works for 20 hours each week. How much does
she make in a week? 400
15S) How many straight lines are needed to divide a regular hexagon into 6 identical
triangles? 3
15M) Which number should come next in this series: 1,4,9,16,25,? 36
16S) What is the average of 12, 6 and 9? 9
16M) DIDIIDID is to 49499494 as DIIDIIDD is to _____? 49949944
17S) There are three 600 ml water bottles. Two are full, the third is 2/3rds full. How
much water is there total? 1600ml
17M) If a wood pile contains 30 kilos of wood and 15.5 kilos are burned, how many kilos
are left? 14.5
18S) Which letter does not belong in the following series: D - F - H - J - K - N - P - R
K
18M) Joe was both 5th highest and 5th lowest in a race. How many people participated?
9
19S) If a certain type of bug lives for only 20 days, how old is the bug when it has lived
half of its lifespan? 10 days
19M) PEACH is to HCAEP as 46251 is to _____? 15264
20S) Begin is to began as ght is to _____? Fought
20M) Nurse is to hospital as teacher is to _____? school
7 Appendix B: The post-test questionnaire
1. How do you think you did on the test? Please estimate your score:
I estimate that I answered ______ of the 20 questions correctly.
2. You probably arent completely sure of exactly how you scored. Please write down a
range of scores below, such that you are 90% sure that your actual score falls somewhere in
the range:
I am 90% sure that I have answered between _____ and _____ questions correctly.
3. Please estimate your percentile ranking. In other words, what percentage of other test
takers do you think had scores lower than yours?
I estimate that ____% of all participants had scores lower than mine on the test.
4. You probably arent completely sure if this percentile ranking either. Please write
down a range of percentile rankings, such that you are 90% sure that your actual percentile
ranking falls somewhere in the range:
I am 90% sure that between ____% and ____% of other test-takers had scores below
mine.
5. How pleasant was the experiment for you?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  9  10
Very unpleasant Very pleasant
6. How important was it for you to answer the questions correctly?
14
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  9  10
Not important Very important
7. How important was it for you to estimate your performance accurately?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  9  10
Not important Very important
8. How important was it for you to answer more questions correctly than other partici-
pants?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  9  10
Not important Very important
9. To what extent did you invest e¤ort in solving the questions?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  9  10
No e¤ort Extreme e¤ort
10. How did your performance on this test compare with your general ability on tests of
this kind?
(1) I did much worse on this test than I ought to have, given my abilities
(2) I did a little worse on this test than I ought to have, given my abilities
(3) My performance accurately reects my ability
(4) I did a little better on this test than I ought to have, given my abilities
(5) I did much better on this test than I ought to have, given my abilities
11. Have you ever taken an IQ test before? (please circle one) Yes No
12. If yes, what was your score?
(1) Under 80
(2) 80-90
(3) 90-100
(4) 100-110
(5) 110-120
(6) Over 120
(7) Dont know / dont remember
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